On Saturday (15/12/12) voters in Egypt will go to the polls in a
referendum to either approve or reject the nations post-revolution
constitution. The official Arabic text of the document can be viewed
here; http://www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/constitution2012.pdf and the English
translation that I've been working from can be viewed here;
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-draft-constitution-translated
On reading the proposed constitution the first problem that becomes
apparent is that large sections of it would seem more at home in the
manifesto of a political party rather then in the constitutional basis
for a sovereign state. For example Article 17 puts a constitutional
obligation on the Egyptian state to foster small handicraft industries.
This may be a very good idea and may be very popular now but in 50, 75
or 100 years the Egyptian economy may well have moved on from small
handicraft industries. As a result this article will at best become
redundant and at worst might actually prove damaging by forcing the
government to spend a portion of money every year on something nobody
wants or needs in order to fulfil the constitutional obligation.
Therefore I think that this along with things like Article 58 which
places an obligation on the state to extend the take up of higher
education are things that an elected government should achieve through
statute rather then through the constitution. A more serious example of
this problem is probably Article 27 which gives workers representation
(up to 50%) on the boards of public and private enterprises. One of the
driving factors of the Egyptian revolution was high unemployment brought
about by a sluggish economy built around outdated and discredited
Communist principles. The notion of the workers being able to share in
the management and profits of a private enterprise is one of those key
Communist principles. So making it a constitutional obligation is only
likely to damage Egypt's economy further. That said my political
background means I'm actually a big fan of things like workers
co-operatives. However while I think that the state most certainly
shouldn't legislate against them it shouldn't be making them compulsory
and most certainly shouldn't be making them a cornerstone of national
identity by including them in the constitution.
Once you delve further into the draft constitution is becomes clear that
these populist articles and the noble language of the preamble have
been included in a cynical attempt to get people to vote for a
constitution that has a thinly veiled Islamist agenda and places a
worrying amount of power in the hands of the President. For the most
part that Islamist agenda is very subtle such as in the oaths of office
to be taken by members of the House of Representatives, the President
and the Prime Minister outlined in Articles 86, 137 and 157. These oaths
all require the person taking them to swear in front of "Almighty God."
With Article 219 referring to the importance of the principles of Sunni
Islam it is quite clear that the Almighty God mentioned is the Sunni
Muslim interpretation of god making this a difficult oath for a
Christian Egyptian or even a Shia Egyptian to take. Even things like
Articles 43 and 44 which guarantees freedom of religion and prohibits
the insulting of religious messengers which seem fair and balanced
conceal an Islamist agenda. Due to very old and restrictive Egyptian
laws governing the way that Christian Churches operate far from ensuring
religious freedom the inclusion of the "as regulated by law" phrase of
Article 43 actually makes it much easier for the Egyptian state to
persecute religious minorities. Although it doesn't say it explicitly
Article 44 is clearly designed to stop people insulting the Prophet
Mohamed and paves the way for something similar to Pakistan's
controversial anti-blasphemy laws. In fact as an article of the
constitution it actually probably goes further then Pakistan's laws.
Similarly Articles 10 and 11 which place religion and morality as the
basis for Egyptian society and place and obligation on the state to
uphold public morality respectively seem to be paving the way for Saudi,
Pakistani or Iranian style morality police who patrol the streets
making sure that women adhere to strict dress codes and unmarried
couples don't speak to each other.
The Islamist agenda even extends to areas you would not expect such as
Article 117 which requires the national budget to achieve a balance
between income and expenditure and Article 121 which prevents the
Executive Authority from obtaining any sort of loan without the approval
of the House of Representatives. Although Egypt's debt to GDP ratio is a
bit on the high side at around 75% and the Eurozone crisis has led to
national debt being unpopular the world over this seems to be an attempt
to force Egypt to run it's economy in line Sharia banking principles
that prevent the charges of interest on loans and generally discourages
the taking out of loans all together. Again if this is an economic
policy that an elected Islamist government wants to follow they should
be free to. However by making it a constitutional obligation it makes
things very difficult for any future government that hasn't been elected
with an Islamist mandate. This article is likely to cause very
immediate problems for Egypt because the nation is currently in the
process of negotiating crisis loans from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) to help ease it's economic turmoil. As Egypt's House of
Representatives is currently suspended Article 121 if passed will make
it impossible for Egypt to take up any IMF loan.
The Islamist agenda is probably at it's most overt in Article 4 which
places a obligation on the Egyptian state and by extension people to
provide the Al-Azhar Mosque/University with sufficient funds to "achieve
it's objectives" which appear to be advising the government on Islamic
law. From a secular perspective the most alarming articles are Article 2
and Article 3. Article 2 sets out Islamic Sharia as the principle
source of legislation while Article 3 sets out the principles of
Christianity and Judaism for the personal status laws Egypt's Christians
and Jews. In these few simple lines Egypt's constitution will, if
adopted, create a two tier society with Sunni Muslims at the top and
Christians and Jews in a lower class. From a secular perspective this is
simply unacceptable and although it seems to have become a dirty word
in Egypt Secularism does not mean Atheism. Instead it means creating a
separation between religion and politics so people be they Sunni
Muslims, Shia Muslims, Sufi Muslims, Salafi Muslims, Christians,
Buddhists or Jews can all practise their religion (all of which worship
the same God) without the interference of the state.
As with the Islamist agenda the biggest problem with the draft
constitution - the sweeping powers given to the President - are shown in
a number of small and subtle articles. These include Article 54 which
gives Egyptian citizens the right to address public authorities under
their own names. This is obviously a right that Egyptians have gained
through the revolution. However the stipulation that this must be done
in the name of the individual rather then in the name of a group seems
like a recipe for the state building a database of known trouble makers
which is the first step towards political oppression. The right to
public assembly/demonstration based on notification by law guaranteed by
Article 50 is a prime example of this. The provision of Article 54
means that in order to lawfully exercise their right to public
demonstration the protest organisers must apply for permission under
their own names rather then semi-anonymously as part of a protest group.
That makes it very easy for the state's authorities to identify protest
organisers in order to arrest, harass and intimidate them and you only
need to look at the revolution to see how badly that can end. Another
example of the state trying to suppress political dissent is Article 53
which stipulates that there can only be one trade union per profession.
If there is only one trade union it makes it very easy for agents of the
state to infiltrate and control the actions of that trade union. This
is actually something my father did in Britain's National Union of
Railwaymen (NUR) in the 1970's.
The much more significant power grabs the draft constitution gives to
the President are the almost sovereign powers it grants the President
over the main apparatus of state security - the police and the military.
Article 146 makes the President the Supreme Commander of the armed
forces and Article 147 gives him sole power to appoint and dismiss
members of the military leadership. While Article 146 stipulates that
the President must receive the approval of the House of Representatives
to declare war or deploy the military outside of Egypt's borders there
is no such requirement for military operations within Egypt's borders.
This very much leaves the military as a play thing of the President
which can be used against the Egyptian people - something that was a
significant problem under Mubarak. A better alternative would be to make
the military the property of the Egyptian people sworn to protect the
constitution and the values of the revolution. It's Supreme Commander
should be someone chosen by the military itself but approved by both the
President and the House of Representatives. In order to declare war or
deploy outside of Egypt's borders there must be triple agreement between
the President, the House of Representatives and the Supreme Commander.
For deployment within Egypt's borders there need only be agreement
between the Supreme Commander and the President or agreement between the
Supreme Commander and the House of Representatives. This would allow
the Egyptian military to side with the Egyptian people against any
future President who starts behaving like a dictator. The same problem
exists with the police with Article 199 making the President the Supreme
Chief of police. This is a recipe for a political police force. A far
better alternative would be to make the police an independent body sworn
to uphold the constitution and the law which selects it's own Supreme
Chief with the approval of the Minister for the Interior. This would
make Egypt's police force an apolitical body better able to uphold the
law regardless of who may be trying to break it.
The most serious and fundamental problem with Egypt's draft constitution
is the way it envisions Egypt's political system working. Having a Head
of State (the President) overseeing a partially elected upper house
(the Shura Council) and a fully elected lower house (the House of
Representatives) Egypt seems to be modelling itself on a British style
Parliamentary democracy only with an elected Head of State rather then a
Monarch. In order for this system of government to work there needs to
be a strong lower house led by a strong Prime Minister to protect the
interests of the people and counter-balance the power of the Head of
State. The semi-elected upper house is supposed to act as a buffer
between the two helping to negotiate compromise. Egypt's draft
constitution simply has no intention of doing any of this. Article 139
gives the President the power to appoint the Prime Minister turning the
office into nothing more then the President's deputy. Article 140 makes
the President responsible for all policy and leaves the Cabinet
appointed by the Prime Minister as simple tools tasked with doing the
President's bidding. Article 128 grants the President the power to
appoint 10% (15 members) of the Shura Council. Assuming that the
President's party will be represented in the elected membership of the
Shura Council this 10% guarantees the President a majority on every vote
turning the Shura Council into a simple rubber-stamping body. A more
democratic alternative would be for the largest party/bloc in the House
of Representatives to choose the Prime Minister who would then appoint
the Cabinet and work with the President to shape and implement policy.
The President and the Prime Minister should both be able to appoint 6%
(9 members) of the Shura Council to ensure balance.
So for this very long list of quite complicated reasons I urge Egyptians
to vote to reject this draft constitution and they will have to vote.
As with the Presidential election the Muslim Brotherhood will mobilise
their members to vote for the draft constitution in large numbers.
Therefore the opposition must vote in equally large numbers to stop them
and prevent the constitution being adopted.
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